If you hear a secret from a friend at midnight, you will know that it was he when he speaks (to you again) at dawn;3000
نیم شب چون بشنوی رازی ز دوست ** چون سخن گوید سحر دانی که اوست
And if two persons bring news to you in the night, you will recognise both of them in the daytime by their (manner of) speaking.
ور دو کس در شب خبر آرد ترا ** روز از گفتن شناسی هر دو را
(If) during the night the sound of a lion and the sound of a dog have come (into some one's ear) and he has not seen their forms on account of the darkness,
بانگ شیر و بانگ سگ در شب رسید ** صورت هر دو ز تاریکی ندید
When day breaks and they begin to make (the same) sound again, the intelligent (hearer) will know them by the sound (which they make).
روز شد چون باز در بانگ آمدند ** پس شناسدشان ز بانگ آن هوشمند
The upshot is this, that both the Devil and the (angelic) Spirit who present (objects of desire to us) exist for the purpose of completing (actualising) the power of choice.
مخلص این که دیو و روح عرضه‌دار ** هر دو هستند از تتمه‌ی اختیار
There is an invisible power of choice within us; when it sees two (alternative) objects of desire it waxes strong.3005
اختیاری هست در ما ناپدید ** چون دو مطلب دید آید در مزید
Teachers beat (school-)children: how should they inflict that correction upon a black stone?
اوستادان کودکان را می‌زنند ** آن ادب سنگ سیه را کی کنند
Do you ever say to a stone, ‘Come to-morrow; and if you don't come, I will give your bad behaviour the punishment it deserves’?
هیچ گویی سنگ را فردا بیا ** ور نیایی من دهم بد را سزا
Does any reasonable man strike a brickbat? Does any one reprove a stone?
هیچ عاقل مر کلوخی را زند ** هیچ با سنگی عتابی کس کند
In (the eyes of) reason, Necessitarianism (jabr) is more shameful than the doctrine of (absolute) Free-will (qadar), because the Necessitarian is denying his own (inward) sense.
در خرد جبر از قدر رسواترست ** زانک جبری حس خود را منکرست
The man who holds the doctrine of (absolute) Free-will does not deny his (inward) sense: (he says), ‘The action of God is not mediated by the senses, O son.’3010
منکر حس نیست آن مرد قدر ** فعل حق حسی نباشد ای پسر
He who denies the action of the Almighty Lord is (virtually) denying Him who is indicated by the indication.
منکر فعل خداوند جلیل ** هست در انکار مدلول دلیل
That one (the believer in absolute Free-will) says, ‘There is smoke, but no fire; there is candle-light without any resplendent candle’;
آن بگوید دود هست و نار نی ** نور شمعی بی ز شمعی روشنی
And this one (the Necessitarian) sees the fire plainly, (but) for the sake of denial he says it does not exist.
وین همی‌بیند معین نار را ** نیست می‌گوید پی انکار را
It burns his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no fire’; it (the thread) stitches his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no thread.’
Hence this doctrine of Necessity is Sophisticism (Scepticism): consequently he (the Necessitarian), from this point of view, is worse than the infidel (believer in absolute Free-will).3015
پس تسفسط آمد این دعوی جبر ** لاجرم بدتر بود زین رو ز گبر
The infidel says, ‘The world exists, (but) there is no Lord’: he says that (the invocation) ‘O my Lord!’ is not to be approved.
گبر گوید هست عالم نیست رب ** یا ربی گوید که نبود مستحب
This one (the Necessitarian) says, ‘The world is really naught’: the Sophist (Sceptic) is in a tangle (of error).
این همی گوید جهان خود نیست هیچ ** هسته سوفسطایی اندر پیچ پیچ
The whole world acknowledges (the reality of) the power of choice: (the proof is) their commanding and forbidding (each other)—‘Bring this and do not bring that!’
جمله‌ی عالم مقر در اختیار ** امر و نهی این میار و آن بیار
He (the Necessitarian) says that commanding and forbidding are naught and that there is no power of choice. All this (doctrine) is erroneous.
او همی گوید که امر و نهی لاست ** اختیاری نیست این جمله خطاست
Animals (too) acknowledge (the reality of) the (inward) sense, O comrade, but it is a subtle (difficult) matter to apprehend the proof (of this).3020
حس را حیوان مقرست ای رفیق ** لیک ادراک دلیل آمد دقیق
Inasmuch as (the reality of) our power of choice is perceived by the (inward) sense, responsibility for actions may well be laid upon it.
زانک محسوسست ما را اختیار ** خوب می‌آید برو تکلیف کار
The inward consciousness of having the power to choose or of acting under compulsion, of anger or self-restraint, of repletion or hunger, corresponds to the senses that know and distinguish yellow from red and small from great and bitter from sweet and musk from dung and hard from soft—by the sense of touch—and hot from cold and burning (hot) from lukewarm and wet from dry and contact with a wall from contact with a tree. Therefore he who denies inward consciousness denies the senses, and (he does) more (than that), (for) inward consciousness is more evident than the senses, inasmuch as one can bind the senses and prevent them from functioning, while it is impossible to bar the way to the experiences of inward consciousness and stop their entrance. And an indication is enough for the wise.
درک وجدانی چون اختیار و اضطرار و خشم و اصطبار و سیری و ناهار به جای حس است کی زرد از سرخ بداند و فرق کند و خرد از بزرگ و طلخ از شیرین و مشک از سرگین و درشت از نرم به حس مس و گرم از سرد و سوزان از شیر گرم و تر از خشک و مس دیوار از مس درخت پس منکر وجدانی منکر حس باشد و زیاده که وجدانی از حس ظاهرترست زیرا حس را توان بستن و منع کردن از احساس و بستن راه و مدخل وجدانیات را ممکن نیست و العاقل تکفیه الاشارة
Inward consciousness corresponds to (external) sensation: both run in the same channel, O uncle.
درک وجدانی به جای حس بود ** هر دو در یک جدول ای عم می‌رود
‘Do’ or ‘don't,’ command and prohibition, discussions and talk are suitable to it (the inward consciousness).
نغز می‌آید برو کن یا مکن ** امر و نهی و ماجراها و سخن
(The thought), ‘To-morrow I will do this or I will do that,’ is a proof of the power to choose, O worshipful one;
این که فردا این کنم یا آن کنم ** این دلیل اختیارست ای صنم